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MORE THOUGHTS ON LOSS DISTRIBUTION
JOHN G. FLEMING
I
The "new learning" about torts focuses attention on, and brings
within the scope of discourse, the manner in which accident losses
are in the last resort actually absorbed or borne, not content merely
with the superficial appearances of a game in which injurer and in-
jured alone appear as candidates for the prize of who should pay the
bill. It lends a new perspective by bringing into the picture other
interests, institutional arrangements and devices which actually play
a vital role in this process of absorbing the cost of accidents. In the
vast bulk of tort cases, sometimes plaintiffs, but most often defendants
"of record" are parties to the claim in only a nominal sense. Not only
do they not conduct their own cases, quite often indeed cooperation
clauses in their insurance contracts compel them to become parties
to litigation against their own wishes. Moreover, although suffering
judgment, the bill is going to be paid by somebody else. While not
exactly engaging in a charade, they remind one of ancient actors
with masks - except that here the mask does not have the purpose
of evoking reality, but rather of obscuring it.
This touch of realism bears down on at least two major facets of
the problem of accident losses. Most attention has been given to the
first, what might be called (in the fashionable jargon of sociologists)
the "vertical" aspect of loss allocation: how is the loss in the last
resort absorbed after first being charged against, let us say, the defen-
dant? Another aspect, which for the sake of symmetry one might call
the "horizontal", arises from the fact that, instead of tort liability
being the sole source of potential compensation (as it was throughout
most of our history) it is now but one of several such sources, and (at
that) carrying an ever deminshing share of the economic burden of
compensating the injured.
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An understanding of both these phenomena is not only essential
for a realistic view of how the community is actually coping with the
social and economic problem of accident casualties; it is also bound to
influence legislative and judicial judgment of how in particular cases
the burden ought best to be borne. In one sense, it converts torts
from a private into a semi-public law area by more deliberately ad-
mitting the public interest to audience and by owning up to what
Polanyi would have called the "polycentric" nature of tort adjudica-
tion (in other words its repercussions-much as a pebble thrown into
a pond - reaching far beyond its immediate impact). It has made
torts into a branch of social security.
I wish to say a few words about each of these facets, bearing in
mind that they cannot be kept apart in airtight compartments, but
are in reality rather closely intertwined. First, then, about the
functioning of tort liability itself as a mechanism for absorbing losses,
aside altogether from its relation to collateral regimes of compensa-
tion.
The conventional image of tort adjudication was one where the
eventual loss either remained where it happened to fall (judgment for
defendant) or where it was shifted from one party to another (judg-
ment for plaintiff). What happened beyond that point nobody took
the trouble so much as even to deign with interest. That was under-
standable enough because until only yesterday (seen in the aspect of
eternity) the effect of legal adjudication was indeed fully spent once
the burden had been allotted to one side or another. Its absorption
beyond that point was neither a matter of interest nor one that
would have repaid concern.
What has overtaken this traditional view is the realization that
tort law can, and often does, perform the function not merely of
shifting but also of spreading the loss; that the defendant instead of
having to foot the bill single-handed is in actual fact more often than
not only a conduit through which the cost is channeled so as eventually
to be disseminated in minute and almost imperceptible fractions among
the whole or an appreciable section of the community. This occurs
whenever the defendant, by virtue of the position which he occupies
in the economy or through the additional device of liability insurance,
is able to pass on the outlay in the manner suggested. A manufacturer,
for example, will treat expenditures incurred in meeting injury claims
by third parties, no less than those by his own work force, as part
of the inescapable overhead of his operations-a cost item, albeit
small, that will enter into the calculation of the price he will charge for
each unit of his product and that will eventually be defrayed in
negligible amounts by all ultimate consumers of the particular line
of merchandise.
Further spreading of the cost may be achieved through insurance.
Very large enterprises, notably governments, their subdivisions,
agencies, and some public corporations, consider it economically
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preferable to operate as self-insurers and absorb the cost of com-
pensation claims, with reference to certain kinds of risks, from current
revenue or special reserve funds maintained for the purpose. Most
others, however, have recourse to professional underwriters who are
in the business of indemnifying the insured against their legal liability
to third parties. Indemnity insurance has made tremendous strides
since its modest beginnings in the declining years of the nineteenth
century, gradually permeating the economy to the point where today
it is widely looked upon as an indispensable prerequisite for doing
business or for engaging even in many private activities like driving
the family car. As somebody once said, the manufacturer would no
more think of dispensing with insurance than with not wrapping up
his goods. Moreover, in an increasing number of instances, insurance
has become compulsory, or at all events virtually so through indirect
compulsion like "financial responsibility laws" as you have in Ontario
where the cover is close to 98% (a much finer record than California's
where coverage is hardly above the 90% mark). Most important,
then. for the present context is the fact that insurance, besides offering
a relatively inexpensive hedge against the risk in question, performs
the vital social function of spreading it -spreading it among those
engaged in the same kind of activity and hence paying premiums
against the same type of risks, thereby making it possible for the
cost to be widely and painlessly absorbed even in regard to hazard-
creating activities like private motoring, pursued by most of us who,
unlike purveyors of goods and services, are not in a position to "pass
the buck".
This change of emphasis from loss-shifting to the loss-spreading
function of tort law is bound to modify much of the conventional
thought concerning the so-called attribution of legal responsibility, and
this in at least three respects. First, it saps most of the strength from
the argument, once so appealing, that the burden of an adverse judg-
ment would have a crushing and debilitating effect on enterprise
generally and the defendant in particular, now that it has become
apparent that the cost can usually be absorbed without in the least
impairing his competitive position or otherwise discouraging the
activity that produced the hazard. This has already borne fruit in
the quite dramatic disappearance of a number of immunities, those
of the state and its subdivisions, the familial immunities and, in the
United States, those of charities. Indeed, realism has come to the fore
in these instances to the point where the spousal immunity is nowa-
days mostly defended not on the tattered argument of old that to
abolish it would undermine familial harmony, but that to the contrary
it would leave insurance companies- no protection against collusion
between husband and wife.
Secondly, it radically challenges the long-accredited argument
that, in order to justify the trouble and expense of shifting the loss,
only misconduct by defendant manifestly deserving society's dis-
approval would be sufficient. For, if it be true that it is socially
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beneficial in itself to compensate the injured, when this can be
accomplished without correspondingly impoverishing another indivi-
dual, we should be much readier to countenance a plaintiff's verdict
that would not so much connote disapproval of the defendant as an
opportunity for financially assisting an accident victim's rehabilitation
by drawing on the resources, not of society as a whole, but of that
particular section alone which participated in the benefits of the risk-
creating activity. This then looks towards an erosion of the fault
requirement, a move towards strict, or at any rate, towards stricter,
liability. This is not the time and place for probing that aspect in
greater detail. I once wrote a whole book about it.
Thirdly, it will increasingly divert attention from social deficiency
as the paramount criterion for legal responsibility to a quest for who
of the parties concerned occupies the most strategic position for dis-
tributing the compensation cost in the fairest and most economical
manner. All the better, of course, if he also happens to be the one
best able to prevent accidents and susceptible to such pressure as in-
surance rating can exert in order to make him fulfill that function.
Among pertinent examples there immediately springs to mind the
modern manufacturer's obligation to answer for the safety of his
product. This, as you know, has made tremendous strides within the
last decade in the United States whose many "forward looking" juris-
dictions now assure recovery, without proof of negligence, or so much
as res ipsa loquitur, to any "ultimate consumer" who suffers injury
in his person or property as a result of a defective product unreason-
ably dangerous to the consuming public. But even if this is not yet
being recognized as a principle of tort liability under the English law,
the actual gap separating the two systems is in reality not very great.
This is so because, for the last half century now, the implied warranty
of merchantability imports a strict or guarantee liability for personal
injuries and property damage no less than for economic loss suffered
by purchasers. This only leaves out of the orbit of protection persons
outside the chain of purchase, such as other members of the pur-
chaser's family, his friends or just bystanders. More significantly left
out in the cold, however, used to be those purchasers who had foolishly,
and more often quite unwittingly, given up their protection by so-
called disclaimer or exemption clauses. Legislation in most juris-
dictions, by outlawing such clauses at least in the most significant
areas of consumer credit sales, has now closed this gap.
Probably the most telling instance of "enterprise liability" in
the common law is the vicarious liability of an employer for the torts
of his servants, which is singularly fitted for the dual task of at once
deflecting recourse from the culpable yet all too vulnerable servant
and, leeching on to the "deep pocket" of the master, exploiting the
latter's superior ability for spreading the cost as a fraction of the price
he charges to his customers. Legislation, because less constrained
than judicial power in breaking new ground, has repeatedly in modern
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times invoked the technique, in implementing a policy of attaching
strict liability to a particular type of enterprise, of consolidating the
duty to procure compulsory insurance and respond to damage claims
in someone, like the owner of aircraft, or the operator of a nuclear
installation, who occupies a position administratively most suited for
discharging the crucial function of insuring allocation of the cost
burden to the risk-creating enterprise and its beneficiaries.
This overriding objective comes into even sharper focus when,
with a view to avoiding the economic waste entailed in unnecessary
proliferation of insurance and perhaps blocking undesirable realloca-
tion of the burden through subrogation or indemnity, recourse against
all other persons is forthwith proscribed. Such, for example, is the
domestic and international legislative pattern for coping with nuclear
incidents, which has selected the operator of a nuclear installation or
ship as the sole lynchpin for administering the insurance scheme, to
the exclusion of all liability of carriers, suppliers of equipment, opera-
tors of conventional vessels, and so forth.1 A modern, judicially in-
spired departure in the same direction, so far confined to America, is
to hold the manufacturer of defective products liable for consumer
injuries but at the same time to excuse the maker of any component
part, on the ground that the fairest and most economic disposition is
for the loss to be absorbed exclusively by the manufacturer of the com-
pleted product who, through advertising, has focused consumer
reliance on his own trade name and is better able to calculate the cost
into the eventual sales price.
2
For the sake of maintaining a balanced viewpoint, it is also need-
ful to sound a note of caution in this context against the all too facile
assumption that this new perspective provides a magical blueprint
for promoting plaintiff's recovery. In the first place, there are many
situations where the defendant does not meet the critical qualifications
because he does not occupy a position in the economy which would
permit him to pass on the loss for eventual distribution and the risk in
question is not so typical that indemnity insurance is well-nigh uni-
versal or at least highly prevalent. "Public liability" policies, for
example, are still comparatively rare among private home-owners
as distinct from occupiers of commercial or industrial premises, so
that, if the special loss-distributing capacity 'of the latter were to be
considered worth exploiting, the relevant rule of law should be
formulated or at any rate applied so as not to bear unjustly upon the
former. Nor, for that matter, is it anything but a perversion of the
argument, if what were considered crucial was that a particular
defendant just happened to be insured rather than that he belonged
to a class of persons who typically are, since recovery would not in
1 See, for example the Nuclear Installations Act, 1965, of the United
Kingdom, and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage,
1963.
2 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instruments (1963), 191 N.E. 2d 81 where the
manufacturer of the aircraft, but not the manufacturer of the defective
altimeter, was held liable for a passenger's death resulting from a crash.
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that event necessarily serve the function of broad and equitable loss
distribution, besides having an unsettling effect on premium rating
practices and injecting an undesirable element of capriciousness into
the administration of the law. Some American courts have, on
occasion, disregarded this precept, for example, in allowing recovery
against a charitable hospital on proof that it was insured. (On a
technical level, this disposition has been justified on the ground that
the purpose of the immunity is to prevent the diversion of charitable
assets, and that this would not occur if the burden of liability would be
met from insurance.)
Secondly, sometimes it is the plaintiff who is the better loss
distributor. Admittedly, no one would lightly advocate that a plaintiff
should forfeit all claim to legal protection against one who has caused
him injury merely because he could have protected himself against the
risk by insurance; for it would adjudge failure to insure a more hein-
ous dereliction than the negligence or other harm-creating conduct of
the tortfeasor. This caution carries the more weight when insurance
against the particular type of risk is nowhere near saturation level.
Personal accident insurance against injury and death, for example, is
still rather sporadic; and, as it happens, the insured is actually re-
warded for his providence by being allowed to recover both the in-
surance proceeds and full undiminished damages from the tortfeasor.
Yet there are some situations in which insurance against a specialized
risk is very widely held by its potential casualties. The most prominent
example, of course, is fire insurance by property owners, which offers
a more economical and equitable method of absorbing fire losses than
the less differentiated, and from the cost point of view easily calcul-
able, general public liability insurance currently offered to potential
defendants. This factor, even if not always openly acknowledged,
may well have influenced the consistent refusal to attach responsibility
to water companies for failing to maintain adequate pressure in their
pipes sufficient to save a house on fire,3 and for the remarkable "New
York fire rule" which exempts tortfeasors (such as railways) from
liability for all but the first building set alight,4 not to speak of the
recent Privy Council decision in The Wagon Mound5 which, in result,
also set drastic limits to the extent of responsibility from a negligent
fire damage. Statutes also which commonly set ceilings on the liability
of railways for fire damage serve much the same purpose. The for-
mula, however, which I would most commend in this connection is that
of the small number of American statutes which, instead, confer the
benefit of the plaintiff's fire insurance on the defendant, i.e. instead
of the insurer being subrogated to the plaintiff's rights against the
defendant, here the defendant is subrogated to the plaintiff's rights
against the insurer.6 This has the advantage of making allowance in
3 Atkinson v. Newcastle Waterworks Co. (1877), 2 Ex. D. 441; Mock Co.
v. Rensselaer Water (o. (1928), 159 N.E. (N.Y. Ct. of Appeals).
4 Ryan v. New York Central R. Co. (1866), 35 N.Y. 210.
5 [1961] A.C. 388.
6 See, e.g., Ferren v. Maine Central R. Co. (1914), 90 Atl. 497 (Me).
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each individual case for whether or not the plaintiff actually is in-
sured; in contrast to the proceding "rough and ready" rules which
apply right across the board regardless of the individual circumstance
of the particular case.
II
Let me now turn to the impact of other compensation regimes
on tort liability. For half a century and more we have become accus-
tomed to look to workmen's compensation for taking care of work
injuries. The inter-war period saw the frail beginnings of disability
insurance, developing into the much more ambitious Social Security
programs associated with the modern welfare state. These vary, of
course, greatly from one country to another in coverage and in the
value of their benefits. In most Western countries, however, they have
long replaced tort liability as the largest source of compensation.
Suffice it here to cite the findings of Professor Linden's remarkable
study that, having regard only to automobile accidents which would
not make much allowance for one of the largest non-tort sources
(namely, workmen's compensation), these non-tort sources took care
of 39% of the total compensation benefits, most significantly very
nearly 100% of the hospital bills due to the embracing cover of the
Ontario Hospital Services Commission. Time was when, aside from
private charity, tort liability provided the only key to compensation
from other than one's own resources. Today, quite patently, tort
liability vies with many other regimes for shouldering that social task.
This raises at least two important questions. The first is which of
several funds available to a particular victim-the defendant's auto-
mobile insurance or workmen's compensation, let us say-should in
the last resort bear the particular loss. Inevitably it involves a
weighing of the competing claims in the light of relevant economic,
social, and (as experience has shown) even downright political con-
siderations. The second question, which stands, on the threshold
of the first, is what part, if any, tort liability may eventually claim to
play in this over-all scheme of social security; in short, what are its
credentials for survival, except as an unimportant adjunct to the
criminal law in cases of physical aggression, defamation, and perhaps
invasion of privacy?
First of all, then, the coexistence of compensation regimes com-
pels an answer to whether benefits shall be cumulative, alternative or
stand in some other relation. This from the point of view of the acci-
dent victim. In the larger perspective of loss distribution, it raises the
question to what extent, if at all, "risk communities" other than that
represented by the tortfeasor are to participate in bearing the loss.
If, for example, the tortfeasor's liability were to be reduced by the
amount of Social Security benefits accruing to the victim-the solu-
tion, by the way, substantially prevailing under the English law-its
effect is that the general community shoulders part of the loss, reliev-
ing pro tanto the specific risk-creating activity (motoring, manufac-
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turing, etc.) represented by the defendant. If, on the other hand, as
happens to be the predominant approach in most other countries, it is
felt that the public purse ought to be relieved if at all feasible, atten-
tion will have to be focused on ways to reallocate to the tortfeasor
expenses already borne by the public fund, not to speak of the tort-
feasor's assuming all obligations for the future. Only an entirely
neutral, laissez-faire or policy-unoriented legal system could abide the
accident victim grasping and retaining the full benefits of both.
Only American law has been lured into that posture. There is no
time now to explore in any detail the "collateral source rule" - no
reduction of tort liability on account of benefits received from a
"collateral source". Suffice it to say that its basis is less to give a plain-
tiff double recovery than to prevent a tortfeasor from getting away
with less than the full measure of his liability. It looks to the damage
done to the defendant rather than the loss suffered by the plaintiff.
For the sake of vindicating the penal principle, it is prepared to subor-
dinate the compensatory function of tort damages.
Not that the collateral source rule necessarily entails the corollary
that the accident victim will reap a windfall, for a number of devices
are at hand in order to reallocate the loss without prejudicing either
one of the two premises: (1) not letting-off the tortfeasor, and (2) not
giving the plaintiff more than a single satisfaction of his loss. Broadly,
these techniques take one of three possible forms: first, by conferring
on the collateral source a right to indemnity, whether by subrogation
(the standard incident of indemnity insurance), assignment or an
independent claim against either the tortfeasor or the recipient of the
benefit; secondly, by the latter returning the benefit to his benefactor,
as in the not infrequent case of conditional gifts or conditional loans;
and thirdly, in the case of otherwise continuing benefits, like periodical
payments, by terminating these as soon as tort damages assure full
compensation for the future. The last provides a suitable model for
most kinds of social security, is the standard solution in New Zealand7
and has also been applied elsewhere, e.g. military pensions in the
United Kingdom.8
Most common, of course, is the first of these methods, indemnity
from the tortfeasor for the benefits conferred on the accident victim
by the claimant. Long familiar as a feature of workmen's compensa-
tion, it has been taken over into most of the world's social security
systems, including among others the Ontario Hospital Services Com-
mission.9 As we know, promotion of the same idea was behind the
attempt to deploy the old action for loss of services for the purpose of
enabling an employer to recover fringe benefits, such as free medical
treatment or disability pay.10 By discouraging this and losing them-
7 Social Security Act, 1964, s. 71.
8 See Carrol v. Hooper, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 345, [1964] 1 All E.R. 845.
9 The Hospital Services Commission Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 176.
10 E.g. R. v. Plichardson, [1948] S.C.R. 57, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 305.
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selves in the irrelevancies of the action's hoary origins,11 it seems
to me, British courts probably did less than justice to the economic
and social needs that were being pressed. Suffice it to say, at any rate,
that German and French courts, confronted with the same problem,
found no similar doctrinal or other obstacle to the support of such
claims by employers, although their legal background in terms of
prevailing theories of tort liability and damage assessment is no wit
different from ours.
More provocative questions by far arise as soon as we emancipate
ourselves from the premise that the tortfeasor's liability must not be
reduced on any account. Least controversial are limits put on the
right of subrogation so as not to prejudice members of the bene-
ficiary's immediate family and thus, in the long run, the beneficiary
himself. Such restrictions are found in most European systems, and
have in recent years extended themselves also into the administration
of Social Security systems.
Much more radical are limitations on subrogation based on
broader considerations of loss distribution such as the better loss-
bearing capacity of one compared with another of several available
sources of compensation. This line of thinking is especially associated
with, and has made, greatest advance in Scandinavia. It starts with
the premise that any claim to recoupment, depending as it does for
vindication on the legal process, carries the burden of justifying itself.
This is of course reminiscent of Holmes' point of departure, except
that he was dealing with the problem of liability, i.e. shifting the loss
from plaintiff to defendant, whereas we are here concerned with
shifting it from a collateral source of compensation to the tortfeasor.
This makes quite a difference as revealed by the fact that Holmes con-
sidered the defendant's fault to furnish a sufficient reason for sup-
porting recovery by plaintiffs, but the prevailing Scandinavian view
deems it generally inadequate to justify recoupment by an insurer.
The position that ordinary negligence does not warrant a shifting
of the loss to the tortfeasor is defended on the ground that recoupment
is for all practical purposes a real issue only as against insured de-
fendants where the deterrent value of liability (on any account highly
problematical) is almost completely evaporated. In any event, any
outstanding balance of uncompensated loss would furnish a sufficient
catalyst for accident prevention. Moreover, once the injured person
has been made whole, there is no further justification for insisting on
the pound of flesh from a tortfeasor guilty merely of ordinary negli-
gence, all the more having regard to the progressively diluted stan-
dards of so-called legal negligence. In addition, attention is also
directed to the high cost of collecting subrogation claims.
By contrast, subrogation is allowed where this would promote
recognized policy objectives. As against tortfeasors guilty of inten-
11 IL.C. v. Hambrook, [1956J 2 Q.B. 641 (C.A.).
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tional misconduct or gross negligence, it is justifiable in order to
promote accident prevention or deter outright antisocial behaviour as
an adjunct to the criminal law. Against operators of ultra-hazardous
activities it is justifiable because they ought to bear the cost of their
own peculiar risks as a matter of sound resource allocation; and in all
other cases of strict liability - which in Scandinavian law means
automobile accidents - as well as where the injury was inflicted "in
the course of trade or business" on the additional ground of the de-
fendant's manifest loss-spreading capacity.
This scheme, in effect, hinges on a calculus of loss allocation that
impinges heavily on basic policies of the law of torts. While not
necessarily at cross purposes, it is calculated to infuse a new set of
values that may ultimately refashion the whole structure of the tort
law of tomorrow. As long, however, as it merely purports to play a
peripheral role on the edges of conventional tort law, is there not
something a trifle invidious about varying a tortfeasor's liability
according to whether his victim happens to be insured or not, whether
the regime that will fix the allocation of the accident cost turns out
to be tort law or insurance law - letting him off the hook in the
one case, but not in the other? In seeking to find an answer to this
question, it is at least worth recalling as one of the perennial facts
of life that the extent of tort liability has never borne any relation
to the magnitude of the defendant's guilt, being entirely dependent on
the fortuitous amount of the loss that happens to ensue. Adding to the
multitude of existing variables the new factor of whether the victim
turned out to be insured does not therefore add a new dimension.
This Scandinavian system of loss allocation is now approaching
its first half centenary. But important as was its educational impact,
its actual operational role was quite modest so long as its range
remained limited to private insurance. It received a very notable
boost, however, when it was recently taken over into Swedish work-
men's compensation and, for a time only, into compulsory health in-
surance. Thus, subrogation came to be limited to cases of intentional
or grossly negligent conduct and traffic accidents, i.e. against auto-
mobile liability insurers. After less than seven more years, all subro-
gation was soundly exorcised from health insurance in 1962, and it is
generally believed to be only a matter of time for workmen's com-
pensation and private insurance to fall into line.
The most categorical repudiation of the philosophy underlying
the collateral source rule is found in the recommendations of the
Monckten Committee in England in 194612 which were in large
measure adopted by Parliament in solving the problem of Alternative
Remedies that attained prominence as the result of the thorough-
going overhaul of the whole Social Security system following the
Beveridge Report.' 3 After canvassing all the conceivable alternatives,
12 Report of Committee on Alternative Remedies (1946).
13 Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942).
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the Committee came down squarely in favor of the compensatory
principle that an injured person should not have the same need met
twice over, dismissing at once the analogy of private accident in-
surance (which was a reward for initiative and thrift) as well as the
argument that he would have himself contributed to the cost of the
scheme. This premise was eventually compromised in Parliament by
the concession that a plaintiff need not bring into account one-half
of the benefit he would receive during the first five years, in token
of his own payments.' 4 Secondly, instead of adhering to the existing
model of a set-off of damages against benefits, the Committee pro-
posed a set-off of benefits against damages. This meant of c6urse
that the tortfeasor would in the end get the advantages of these
benefits in the form of reduced liability; in sum, that to this extent
he would be exonerated at the expense of Social Security.
The reasons given in support of this, duly adopted, proposal
were essentially negative, aimed at minimizing administrative diffi-
culties rather than positively seeking to promote loss allocation in a
particular direction. At the forefront was the conviction that it would
be undesirable, especially for a governmental agency, to instigate
litigation, perhaps without or even contrary to the wishes of the
injured person. Besides, it would involve heavy expenses in main-
taining a staff for investigation and in the legal cost of collecting
promising claims. Not least was the pervasive English concern with
reducing the volume of litigation-underlying as it did the recom-
mendation against any form of recoupment as well as the initial
insistence that the injured person not be allowed more than a single
recovery in the hope, indeed, that in all but the very serious accidents
he would be satisfied with National Insurance benefits and not pursue
his chances in common law proceedings.
The difference between the British and the original Scandinavian
solution remains profound. True, they share the common link of
breaking away from the conventional shibboleth of subrogation as a
desirable adjunct for the vindication of tort law. Beyond that, how-
ever, they differ both in orientation and effect. The Scandinavian
discriminates between different classes of tortfeasors in active pro-
motion of social policies relative to accident prevention and capacity
for loss distribution. The British is content with a more abstract
choice that Social Security might as well relieve all tortfeasors, what-
ever the nature of their "wrong" or ability to absorb the loss. So
much for their differences in philosophy.
In actual operation, the two schemes are no less disparate. For
all practical purposes, subrogation is of course of no real moment
except against insured or institutional defendants. Yet it is precisely
against these that subrogation continues to enjoy official sanction in
Sweden. In contrast, the principal thrust of the British formula
is for Social Security 'o shoulder a substantial portion of the auto-
14 Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, 1948, s. 2.
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mobile accident bill. Those who attach great importance to the eco-
nomic calculus of resource allocation may be tempted to deplore that
a particular activity or industry may thus escape paying a portion
of its own proper operating costs, thereby distorting the true cost of
the economic product.15 That the British legislator has not been over-
concerned with this, indeed has not shrunk from deliberately sub-
ordinating it to competing considerations of national benefit, is shown
by the decision, at the time of abolishing workmen's compensation,
henceforth to make a flat charge for the cost of industrial injury
benefits, precisely so that the extra-dangerous industries (which also
broadly happened to be those of greatest national importance) thus
receive an indirect subsidy. In any event, this insensitivity for finer
discriminations between different "risk communities" is least open
to rebuke in case of automobile accidents for the simple, if robust,
reason that motor transport represents an activity from which all
members of the community benefit in substantial measure. Whether
a portion of the accident bill is therefore borne by a social security
fund to which virtually all citizens make contribution or by the
premium-paying motoring community does not make a great deal of
difference, especially when automobile insurance is compulsory and
the cost, except in the case of "private" motoring, can be readily
passed on as a cost item in the pricing of goods and services.
Finally, let me say only one brief word about the last question
broached, namely, the eventual fate of tort liability as a source of
compensation for accident victims. As I see it-and I confess it to
be a long, very long guess-the function eventually reserved for tort
law in the larger scheme of social security will be at best to supply
additional aid and redistribute the accident cost with more discrim-
ination. One of the more perplexing problems arising from the co-
existence of tort liability and other systems of compensation, so
startlingly disparate in point of their respective benefits, is the re-
valuation of the claim by those tortiously injured to so large and
seemingly disproportionate a share of bounty. Ontario, in company
with many other countries, enforced just such an adjustment by
abolishing all tort recovery against an employer as the price for
offering the much lower but assured benefits of workmen's compen-
sation; and it is probably not too bold a guess that, under the stress
of social necessity, other types of accidents may eventually qualify
for similar re-appraisal. A straw in the wind, at least, is that most
proposals advocating the introduction of a compensation scheme for
traffic victims contemplate some limitations on recovery, such at least
as the abolition of damages for non-economic loss.
Tort law's second peculiar task stems from its capacity for dis-
tributing the cost of accidents with greater discrimination and finesse
than is either desired or possible under a general social security
program. Being essentially a form of "enterprise or sponsorship"
15 See Calabresi, Some Reflections on Risk Distribution (1961), 70 Yale
L.J. 499.
(VOL. 4:161
1966] More Thoughts on Loss Distribution 173
liability, it is designed to pass off the cost among those who benefit
from or participate in the risk-creating activity. In what I said earlier
in comparing the Scandinavian and British schemes, you may find
some answers to the challenging questions whether and, if so, to
what extent the cost of particular accidents should properly be borne
by the one or the other.
